Conclusion

Towards a meta-theory of restoration reconciling the tangible and intangible heritages
…when a part of one’s person is lost, it should be replaced in kind, bone for bone, muscle for muscle, hairless skin for hairless skin, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’. Accordingly, when filling in a defect, the first principle of reconstructive surgery is: replace ‘like-with-like’.¹

Part I and Part II of this thesis argued that the tangible and the intangible heritages support diverse interpretations of the past and that each domain appears to come together (and/or fracture) over the concept of authenticity in the practice of restoration. The thesis also argued that recent movements with respect to intangible heritage (now understood as the overarching paradigm through which all heritages are perceived) have challenged traditional notions of authenticity that were formerly based solely on materials and form but now are also understood in terms of process. Part III argued that process was central to the Heritage Preservation Movement of the C19th. and that the idea of intangible heritage was equally important and, although not hitherto formally sanctioned, has recently had an important influence on aspects of the heritage sector in the United Kingdom – in particular architectural preservation and the role of museums. Crucially, however, the professionalisation of conservation has not formally incorporated these wider developments; and, indeed, in many ways is diametrically opposed to them.

In addition to this, the theoretical analysis provided throughout the text highlighted how scientific epistemology affects the ‘stock of knowledge’ in the field and argued that this, in turn, contributes to the historical ‘separation’ of the tangible heritage from the intangible heritage – a characteristic of Western culture, wherein intangible heritage remains of only secondary importance. This has been described in this thesis as a process of naturalisation – whereby unique, value-laden, and historically-transcendent perspectives of ‘heritage’ are subsumed into the authorised, the given and the consensual – as part of an essentially reductive and ‘closed’ view of the past.

For this reason, the thesis has drawn attention to methodological tools used for

interpreting the past (and our subsequent intentions) which have their own lineage and why it argues that this must be taken into account if we are to understand the breadth and depth of intangible heritage. This is based on the hypothesis that the central philosophical problem of preserving ‘heritage’ (in the fullest sense) is essentially epistemological in nature. It is with this in mind that the conclusion to this thesis calls for an ‘opening up’ of our understanding of the past, in part, to counter these reductionist tendencies.

The accomplishment of this would necessitate the creation of an intellectual ‘pathway’ into a broader (and therefore more inclusive) understanding of ‘heritage’ which would enable the transmutation from the exclusivity of a ‘modern’ to the plurality of a ‘post-modern’ vision. Indeed, this seems essential when one considers the recent broad paradigmatic movements in global heritage concerns (with respect to values and diversity) and the ‘world picture’ which is subsequently emerging. Such an approach would in effect aim to (re-)synthaise ontology with epistemology (fractured by naturalisation) and heal a historical rupture brought about by methodological abstraction and reduction, which (this thesis has argued) has brought about a sense of disconnectedness and discontinuity (and therefore disinheritance and disenfranchisement) within the heritage community; hence the separation of the tangible v. intangible domains.

In order to achieve this ontological / epistemological synthesis, it is first necessary to understand the intangible heritage of European culture. We are, therefore, invariably led to the historical movements in European thought which formulated the historical antecedents of our present day intentions – some of which have become institutionalised and subsequently administered (i.e. ‘authorised’), others not. With respect to this, a clear turning point concerned the ‘authentic’ and (in particular) how our understanding of this concept was historically transformed through the (so-called) intellectual evolution from ‘faith to fact’ – which has been described herein as a transition from religion to science, from the spiritual to the material, from the inner to the outer, from the living subject to the inanimate object, from ontology to (scientific) epistemology and from the intangible to the tangible and so on.

This dualistic character of European thought has also been described as reflecting a
A hermeneutical shift from a *hermeneutic interius* to a *hermeneutic extrinsecus* which is connected to the emergence of Western materialism (sometimes derogatorily referred to as ‘scientistic materialism’). This is historically inextricably bound to the European Church Reforms and the intellectual developments of the succeeding centuries, such as the European Enlightenment, which can be understood as part of the ‘Great Transformation’ of modernity – a phrase used to describe the changes which occurred in European culture from about 1700 to about 1900.\(^2\) It is for this reason why a broad interpretation opens this conclusion (in Section 4.1.1, next), which also helps to ‘locate’ the ‘intangible’ within a wider historiographical context; thus offering breadth and depth.

**4.1.1: Understanding the past: prelude to an era**

The issues concerning restoration that emerged in the early C19th. in the United Kingdom and continued throughout the C20th. can be connected historically to the European Church Reforms of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Reforms were the precursor to the period of European Enlightenment which saw a new consciousness emerge particularly in Protestant countries. The interpretation and subsequent re-inscription of the New Testament was a characteristic of Protestantism. The search for *original meaning* through textual exegesis was essentially a response to the questions raised by the Reformation debate about the authentic meaning of the Biblical text and by the Enlightenment questions about epistemology and philology.

The Reformers challenged the Roman Catholic understanding that the text could only be interpreted through the lens of a tradition of understanding and that its true meaning was not immediately evident to the individual reader. They (the Reformers) asserted that ‘truth’ was accessible to the contemporary reader and that the basis for faith and doctrine could (therefore) be developed *sola scriptura* without reference to tradition. This had the effect of cultivating a hermeneutical consciousness which

\(^2\) The changes most central to the Great Transformation are: the growth of modern market economies; the development of modern nation-states and a state-based system of international relations; technological changes involved in the industrial revolution; advances in military technology and organisation; and the expansion of the franchise and erosion of aristocratic privileges. See for example, Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, Beacon Press, 2002 (first published in 1944).
pervaded all aspects of the ‘modern’ civilisation.\(^3\)

In contrast with Protestantism, Catholicism (the formative religion of Europe) maintained a predilection for continuity and belief in or advocacy of change by degrees and the authority of the clergy (based on a tradition of understanding). Catholicism, therefore, tended to resist ‘going back’ to origins in favour of accumulated meaning (which may also be called ‘incrementalism’ or ‘gradualism’). The influence of this theological schism (which has become familiarly known as the Reformation), and the resultant hermeneutical consciousness, may thus be understood as a kind of Protestant restoration. Its emphasis on the individual became a characteristic of the Protestant era.

The attempt to reform the Church by a restoration of primitive Christianity (i.e. based on the study of Scripture) was largely instigated by the work of Desiderius Erasmus. It had the effect of breaking the continuity of the Western religious tradition, invariably leading to a hiatus in the continuity and unity of the common inheritance of culture. The ‘separation’ from Rome, and the subsequent assertion of the Nation States of Europe (a characteristic of the Great Transformation of modernity) were part of this historical process.\(^4\) However, the tradition of Western culture continued to be transmitted through the Guilds of the craftsmen and the workshops of the artisans at the vernacular-level.

In thought, observation and explanation shaped modern intellectualism in the ‘new’ Protestant era; reason and rationality became the guiding ‘lights’ of modern ‘Enlightenment’ philosophers who came to ‘rescue’ civilisation from the ‘dogma’ of tradition and laid the foundations of the Western epistemological tradition. All things knowable could henceforth be ascertained in a rational manner; anything that could not was not reasonable. The ‘new’ hermeneutical consciousness, postulating the supremacy of reason and rationality, empiricism and methodological reductionism and objectivity (i.e. impartiality) demanded evidence in the form of observable,

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\(^3\) Friedrich Ast (1778 – 1841) was an important early writer on the subject. See also, P. Harrison, *The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural Science*, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

measurable phenomena.\(^5\) Such ‘unprejudiced’ knowledge implied control which conferred ‘power’.\(^6\) Directed towards the natural world (i.e. *hermeneutic extrinsecus*) this led to advances in the physical sciences; (such as, physics, chemistry and biology). ‘Origin’ subsequently became a guiding metaphor; Newtonian mechanics searched for *originary* laws while Darwin, *originary* species. The human sciences followed; for example, in politics, economics, history and later the social sciences – which became ‘the true heirs of humanism’ (but perhaps without the spiritual dimension of a Religion).\(^7\)

It was the quest for positive factual knowledge that characterised the Western (scientific) epistemological tradition; museums and universities – which became the intellectual ‘engine rooms’ of the Secular State – are (arguably) its contemporary heirs.\(^8\) Scientific economics has its origins in Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations*.\(^9\) Its outcome was Capitalism; later consumerism. When Capitalism fused with Newtonian mechanics; the practical (i.e. rational and reasonable – and perhaps inevitable) outcome was C19th. industrialism.\(^10\) Capitalistic industrialism – the basis of political economy (the so-called ‘dismal science’ whose driving force is profit)\(^11\) thus (in a sense) entered the vacuum created by the separation of the newly reformed Church from the Secular State – marking the shift from Theocracy to Polity (and forming modern democracy) which characterised modern liberalism. Its success was most noticeable amongst the Protestant peoples – in particular in Holland and the

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5 Francis Bacon (1561-1626); John Locke (1632-1704); Isaac Newton (1643-1727) and René Descartes (1596-1650) were important early influences.

6 This is a reference to Francis Bacon’s (1561-1626) the *Meditationes Sacrae*, 1597 in which he declared *scientia potentia est* – a Latin maxim which has been translated into English as: *knowledge is power*. Bacon preached the instrumental character of science and its power to transform – so that man might become the master of nature. This recalls the distinction between the Ruskinian and Viollet-le-Ducian conceptions of history discussed in Section 3.1.1.


8 According to Christopher Dawson political nationalism took the place of Christian humanism over the past two centuries as part of the secularisation of education (p.68); and was eventually superseded by the ideal of scientific specialisation (p.119); for him scientific specialisms do not provide a complete intellectual education and tend to disintegrate into ‘technologies’. Such a technologist is not an educated person but merely an instrument of the industrialist or the bureaucrat (p.132); in *The Crisis of Western Education*, Sheed and Ward, 1961.

9 A. Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and the Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, 1776 was a cornerstone in its development.

10 Some believe the Industrial Revolution to be applied Newtonian Science; see *Interpretive Social Science: A Reader*, edited by P. Rabinow and W. Sullivan, University of California Press, 1979 (p.281).

11 This derogatory view of modern political economy was expressed by Thomas Carlyle; see Section 3.1.1.
Through this ‘Great Transformation’, the United Kingdom emerged as one of the most prosperous nations in the C19th, but at the same time responsible for vast environmental pollution. Thomas Carlyle, Augustus Pugin and John Ruskin and their followers were important critical voices in their concerns for the environment (especially Ruskin) and for the moral well-being of mankind which had (for them) been corrupted by various aspects of a modern civilisation which had become dominated by a new scientific order. Its materialistic, individualistic, money-grubbing ‘trading’ characteristics (which had the effect of liberating mankind’s natural impulse to greed); its tendency to mechanise human thought; and the progressive alienation of mankind from nature and from the roots of his origins were all abhorrent to them. It was the creed of the Enlightenment that Western civilisation was destined to expand by the progressive influence of science, trade and humanitarian ideals until it became a true world civilisation. The processes of globalisation are (arguably) a continuation of this goal.

This historical process has thus determined (in the widest sense) our methodological tools of interpretation and our subsequent modes of practice. The C19th. Arts and Crafts Movement, for example, imbued with a Christian moral ethic, rejected the scientific management of the ‘alienated’ modern worker who in the process was reduced to a mere mechanical contrivance – stifling his spiritual well-being and denigrating his freedom of expression. This would be resisted by supporting the continuity of practice – the antithesis to the ‘non-participating observer’ who attempts to ‘restore’ knowledge about the past that he himself has not inherited through practice. The traditional Arts and Crafts were sanctified in the process, and at the same time became an anachronism in the context of the new ‘technocratic’

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13 See for example, *The Cultures of Globalization*, edited by Fredric Jameson (et. al), Duke University Press, 2003 (first published in 1998). Organisations such as UNESCO and the World Bank and concepts such as One World Archaeology are (arguably) part of this crusade.

14 This is not unlike ECCO’s understanding of the conservator-restorer as requiring merely ‘manual dexterity’ and the ability to think in accordance with the bureaucratic system (i.e. the profession) that envelopes him; quite the antithesis of intangible heritage.
Civilisation.

Crucially, it was Ruskin’s and Morris’s view that the modern alienated worker had no right to restore the monuments that belonged more properly to ‘Christendom’ and which thus represented the creative spirit of a bygone era. The Arts and Crafts Movement sought to harness this spirit through traditions of practice (which also provided the knowledge-base for the work of the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings). History would be lived out in practice in order to ensure deeper and, therefore, more complete understanding of the past. This was seen by its followers as a form of restitution – it was pre-capitalistic, pre-industrial, pre-mechanical and (for that reason) pre-scientific in character – creating a tendency towards pre-lapsarianism.

This understanding established the need for an ecology of human life – perhaps the greatest of all possible preservation theories; an idea which has (in recent times) found its way into UNESCO through the formal recognition of intangible heritage. The thesis argues, therefore, that a similar hermeneutical consciousness, based on people and their values (i.e. hermeneutic interius), characterises the post-modern period. The Arts and Crafts Movement thus can be seen in some ways to anticipate the post-modern conception of heritage preservation. It was a comprehensive understanding of ‘heritage’ that sought to sustain and incorporate what has subsequently become known as the safeguarding of the intangible heritage. The Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings (SPAB) in 1877 and the Arts and Crafts Movement (which followed shortly after) taken together were a modern cult of authenticity which synthesised the tangible / intangible heritages; and, overcame the diachronic / synchronic paradox through an elevated concept of an historical document.

However, the C20th. has seen the field riven by competing theories. The practice of scientific conservation (for example) emerged in the first quarter of the C20th. and found favour in the scientific / technical and political-institutional sectors in Europe.

16 Refer to Part I and Part II conclusions.
and throughout the West. This essentially archaeo-museological approach (which also now draws on fine arts restoration theory) subsequently formed the basis of tangible heritage preservation.

4.1.2: Tangible heritage preservation

In broad terms, in Europe and throughout the West, tangible heritage preservation was established upon an essentially ‘scientific’ interpretation of existing material remains. This was characterised by an essentially positivistic historiography combined with technical studies in the physical sciences (for example, chemistry and physics). This approach continues to predominate in the scientific / technical and political-institutional sectors. This provided the basis for professional conservation practice (as reflected in the formalisation of ethics and guidelines for education and training and continuing development). The C20th. has introduced this approach to the preservation of wider heritage domains. It may be generically referred to as ‘scientific conservation’ or ‘scientific restoration’. Some consider scientific conservation-restoration to be the second phase of ideas instigated by the C19th. Arts and Crafts-oriented Heritage Preservation Movement – gaining wide acceptance in the post-WWII period (particularly in advanced ‘technological’ societies).

The practice of conservation and restoration is essentially what might be termed a creative practical discipline. Thus the restorer, the preserver of tangible heritage, is necessarily an artist of his time. However, education and training in the heritage sector has become increasingly scientific; and thus technical and rational in its thinking rather than being artistic and based on ideologies that are informed by custom. This is attributable, in part, to the on-going aspiration for professional standing (historically, technical / rational studies and ‘professionality’ are synonymous in the United Kingdom) and the difficulty that training institutions have in cultivating high levels of artistic / creative capabilities (and associated aesthetic sensibilities) which are vital in some disciplines, such as furniture and decorative art. Like the discipline of archaeological conservation (which has been hugely influential

in the shaping of the profession in the United Kingdom), the discipline of artefact conservation emphasises the positive interpretation of materials and their subsequent documentation. Documentation of interventive practice is also fundamental. The availability of resources, such as libraries, advanced technologies and funding, is a major factor in its success in public sector institutions.

In such contexts, the practice of restoration (which is formally defined as \textit{adding to} not \textit{removing from} the historical document) is generally not favoured; it may even be considered unethical. In practice, the primary concern of conservation (as reflected in education and training) lies in the revelation, identification and subsequent preservation of original material fabric. This places greater value in originality \textit{not} in later alterations / additions (hence the tendency to reject restoration by \textit{adding to}). This can lead to the tendency to remove later additions (i.e. restoration by \textit{removing from}) which are shown (typically by textual research and technical examination) to not be historically ‘appropriate’. In the case of furniture and decorative art, for example, the removal of surface coatings through ‘cleaning’ – sometimes referred to (in a derogatory sense) as stripping – is not uncommon. When restoration (interpreted as \textit{adding to}) is deemed necessary, ‘non-like’ materials may be used ‘ethically’. This is usually determined on two primary grounds; i: to preserve the original historical fabric and ii: to unify the object visually to make it more aesthetically ‘legible’. This approach relates to the values that are attributed to the object; in this case ‘historical’ and ‘aesthetic’, respectively. In line with the introduction of conservation teaching, the use of ‘non-like’ ‘conservation grade’ materials has increased substantially in this domain in recent years.

In loss-compensation, the use of ‘non-like’ materials is typically not considered restoration because it only seeks to realise \textit{visual unity} (or ‘oneness’ in Brandian terms). Casting modern synthetic resins in order to replicate wood-carving is a typical example, but this may also include modern foams used to replace traditional upholstery or modern synthetic coatings to replace traditional lacquer and so on. Conservation ethics, such as reversibility, are designed to ensure their removal without causing harm to the ‘valued’ historical fabric – which bears out that such added material is \textit{not} valued. Minimum-intervention (another ethical principle) may also be used to justify the use of ‘non-like’ materials. Justification (in terms of the
written word) is based on compatibility – which, in scientific conservation is determined scientifically – and not necessarily on any conceptual grounds, such as authenticity. Such restorations may be referred to as ‘neutral’. In furniture and decorative arts – a highly skilled area requiring a great deal of ‘hands-on’ practical expertise (i.e. knowledge of how) – complex restorative intervention tends not be undertaken in public institutions.\(^{19}\) This is largely due to time / cost factors and the availability of the necessary expertise. In such cases, restoration work tends either to be contracted out (to appropriate artists and/or craftspeople) or it is acquired by the institution having already been restored by the same. In this sense, the (so-called) craftsman-restorer is anonymous because his/her (arguably vital) contribution to the field tends not to be included in the ‘authorised’ literature (more on this later).\(^{20}\)

It is upheld in scientific conservation that authenticity cannot be added to the object; it can only be revealed in so far as it exists. This is consistent with the general disliking of restoration (in the adding to sense of the meaning) and the associated traditional arts and crafts practices. The object is also understood as an historical document – which (supposedly) represents physically human activity stratified in time. This is central to the object’s accumulated symbolic meaning and acquired aging characteristics (i.e. ‘age-value’). However, this interpretation of authenticity has the effect of denying the continuity of the historical document (understood as the tangible expression of intangible heritage) from the time when it ‘emerges’ as historically significant. In museums, for example, aesthetic and historical values (intangibles but not intangible heritage) are given preference while others, such as function and use, materials and substance; spirit and feeling, traditions, techniques and original creative propriety (other aspects of authenticity) typically change and tend to be downplayed. From then on an attempt is made to suspend (or ‘freeze’) the

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\(^{19}\) The author has examined every conservation journal published by the Victoria and Albert Museum (from 1992 to 2005) but was unable to find a highly complex restoration project in furniture. Examples looked for were such things as major splits and/or warps in table-tops, missing legs on chairs (such as cabriole – which are difficult to make), major losses (at least 30%) in decorative veneer-work (such as marquetry or Boulle-work); no suitable examples were found.

\(^{20}\) A good example of this can be found in Oddy’s introduction to The Art of the Conservator, edited by A. Oddy, British Museum Press, 1992 in which he criticises ‘craftspeople’ but does not take into account that the British Museum’s Horological Department contracts out to such specialists when the restoration work is too difficult to do in-house. This information was obtained in a discussion with Jeremy Evans (who has been working in the Horological Department for over thirty years) during an arranged site visit to the British Museum on 8\(^{th}\) November 2005. The discussion has not been transcribed.
object in time. It is for this reason that the primary goal of conservation practice is to understand, explain and retard the underlying causes of material deterioration (i.e. to arrest mutability). This goal is a specific condition of the museum (or gallery) environment in which these ideas first emerged and have subsequently been deployed.

However, in museums the hermeneutical function of time becomes distorted through time; which has been referred to in this thesis as the ‘time-wall’ of historicism. This is largely attributable to a scientific interpretation of the heritage which is based solely on its materiality; the tangible object being the evidence which provides information or ‘factual’ data about the past. This positivist historiography is, for the most part, constructed by ‘non-participating’ observers and not lived out in practice by ‘connected’ participators; i.e. it is disconnected from relative ‘human’ concerns. This informs the ‘synchronic’ conception of heritage preservation; a conception which predominates in the Western scientific / technical and political-institutional sectors of Europe and the West. It is superimposed upon culture itself – primarily through education; for example, by museums and universities. The acquired effect has been described in this thesis as a feeling within Western civilisations that the past is a completed development – as if viewed through a diorama – leading to a feeling of disconnectedness or disinheritance; a product of the so-called ‘time-wall’.

Scientific conservation (as informed by an essentially archaeo-museological / fine arts model), brings this conception of ‘tangible heritage preservation’ into wider disciplinary and cultural contexts through its administrative organisation (associated with professionalisation). It is theoretically diametrically opposed to intangible heritage (and the diachronic viewpoint).

4.1.3: The safeguarding of the intangible heritage

The intangible heritage has been defined (broadly) in this thesis as essentially referring to the values that are attributed to a historicity of understanding as represented by the activities of people in the present; for example, through continuity of practice. Essentially it is knowledge-led rather than information-led. This may be manifested in individuals, groups, communities, regions or even nations. It may thus be an entire way of life or a unique specialism. But essentially it concerns particular forms of knowledge, and may incorporate the (so-called) ‘tacit dimension’. Value is
attributed to this knowledge which typically has been shaped through time in the
form of technique (i.e. knowledge of how). The continuity of its ‘performance’
determines its significance as a meaning-conferring activity which (in turn)
determines its essentially ontological status. It is distinct from scientific
epistemology – but it is nonetheless knowledge. For this reason intangible heritage
can be described as ontological and epistemological (in the knowledge of how sense).
Such practices are associated with custom; which may extend for many generations
remaining relatively unchanged. Typically, this intensifies their meaning-conferring
qualities (and therefore value). However, they are not static. Intangible heritage is in
constant flux; relative to the environment (as with tangible heritage). But unlike
tangible heritage (which is inanimate) intangible heritage is ‘living’ through its
embodiment in people. The person (or subject) is thus the bearer and transmitter of
this knowledge and his/her work is its physical (i.e. tangible) manifestation.

Intangible heritage is associated with traditional arts and crafts practices. It is
typically highly skilled and characterised by heightened aesthetic understanding. It
has deep significance to the bearer who will have a highly emotive ‘connection’ with
the activity – i.e. it is subliminal. Practice is informed by a body of knowledge
manifested in traditional skills, typically (but not always) associated with the use of
simple technology and natural materials (as opposed to advanced technology and
synthetic materials). The kinds of tools (i.e. technology) have been designed and thus
evolved historically in relation to the knowledge and the material. A change in the
material necessarily means a change in the technology and, by extension, the
knowledge required in its use (and a potential break in continuity). Intangible
heritage, in this sense, is ‘pre-scientific’ (and thus pre-synthetic) in character. Such
modalities of knowing are typically extant in localised, non-institutionalised,
contexts – a traditional craft workshop, for instance. In the past this would have been
conditioned by local need; although this is less relevant today – particularly in
advanced technological societies. They, nonetheless, have a social and cultural
connectedness which provides a living mediation of an otherwise ‘de-humanised’
tangible record ‘of the past’.

For the bearers of intangible heritage the past (i.e. history) is experienced as a mode
of understanding. It represents the aggregate of human thoughts which have been
conditioned by a world of complex values and meanings. It is an inheritance. And practice is the idiom of performance. As such, the continuity of practice may be experienced as a process of self-realisation; like an unbroken ‘stream of consciousness’ which has been shaped and sustained in practice by the transmission of ‘knowing’ from one generation to the next – from one bearer to another. This may be described (intellectually) as a historicist historiography. The continuity of intangible heritage links the past to the present in living form – which contrasts with the positivist historiography (which understands history as a form of enquiry about what actually happened in the past).\footnote{This has been described by Michael Oakeshott in Roy Tseng’s \textit{The Sceptical Idealist}, Imprint Academic, 2003.}

In the traditional arts and crafts, for instance, this sense of continuity was typically achieved through father-to-son apprenticeship (i.e. subliminal apprenticeship) or from master to apprentice (i.e. formal or contract apprenticeship). This method of knowledge-transfer is highly valued amongst artist / craftspeople for its attainment of high levels of artistic / creative capability.\footnote{In fact, many highly skilled artists and/or craftspeople that I communicated with during this research believe that the heritage sector has suffered at the demise of the traditional apprenticeship training system. The formal training that replaced this (i.e. universities and colleges) is clearly not very good at transmitting this ‘tacit dimension’ from one generation to the next.}

Being practice-based, artefacts (which are frequently considered to be part of the history of that practice) are interpreted as \textit{conveyors of meaning} – rather than solely (or even primarily) as evidence or data-carriers (as typified by the positivistic interpretation). The approach to restoration requires an ability to ‘negotiate’ with the creator but not in a literal sense (which is clearly impossible) but in a knowledge-of-practice sense and in a sublimated way. Without the historicity of understanding this \textit{de facto} cannot occur. High standards in training – which must surely seek to cultivate this – are thus vital to its safeguarding. Accordingly, for the bearer of intangible heritage the action of restoration may be an emotive experience (not merely a mechanical one). For instance, a contemporary master wood-carver is likely to know when Grinling Gibbons ‘had a bad day’ because he/she will have cultivated the ability to ‘read’ his work; he/she will see his failings and equally appreciate his genius. In this sense, he will be in ‘negotiation’ with the maker at a high level of sublimation. This clearly cannot be achieved by the technical study of materials, or allied academic disciplines such as, design or art history – which are merely an adjunct to restoration. Nor can it be achieved by learning how to cast with modern...
synthetic resins instead of learning how to carve in wood. Yet, this is the present national (possibly international) requirement of conservation training to become a (so-called) 'Master of Art'.

In understanding the work in this way the trained practitioner (be he/her referred to as a ‘conservator’ or ‘restorer’) is ‘connected’ to the original maker – epistemologically and (to some extent) ontologically. The continuity of that practice, which, in terms of knowledge, is (arguably) its closest connection to the present, is surely a testament to the continuity of the maker’s field of expertise? It is for this reason that such knowledge links the past to the present (and thus bridges the ‘gap’ of historicism). Typically, therefore, the object to be worked on is not understood as a material thing that has ailments. And although some technical understanding may be useful in practice, this is generally considered subsidiary – useful information which can (nowadays) be called upon whenever needed. It can be argued that only at this level of understanding can judgements about restoration (i.e. materials, techniques and extent of intervention) be truly ethical because without this there is no reliable datum for such judgements to take place.

With intangible heritage there is no formalisation in ethics or guides and/or codes of practice but in relation to restoration there may be an implicit understanding of authenticity; which is often reflected in the use of such terms as ‘respect’, ‘integrity’ and ‘feeling’ (hence its subliminal nature). Because of its complexity it cannot readily be ‘reduced’ to the level of rational criteria (such as inscribed values) or delineated in the form of a text; it is objectified in the work carried out. Typically (but not always), restoration follows a ‘like-with-like’ approach as the materials used are closely related to the techniques employed (and therefore central to the continuity of practice). Importantly, it can follow a ‘like-with-like’ approach (whenever deemed necessary) because the knowledge is in place which allows for this; it cannot happen otherwise. Attitudes to minimum-intervention tend to be less hostile. There is less emphasis on the scientific identification of original material fabric – largely because of the lack of availability of (and therefore reliance upon) advanced technologies in

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23 According to Gadamer, true historical knowledge can be gained only by seeing the past in its continuity with the present; see Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, Sheed and Ward, 1975 (pp.292-293).
‘localised’ working contexts (where intangible heritage exists).

Some deviation to materials (and therefore techniques) may occur as part of the advancement of the practice but this tends to be gradual and not usually done in such a way that it subordinates practice. As such, when a new material or process gains preference, this must be determined within the tradition itself and not by anyone who has not been ‘enculturated’ into that tradition; the very purpose of education (the very basis of culture). However, this can lead to insularity which has often been criticised in a derogatory way by ‘outsiders’ as secretive or narrow-minded (consider, for example, the phrase ‘trade secrets’), but which originates historically in a form of protection.\(^\text{24}\) Intangible heritage can thus be recognised for its insularity which becomes a habit of mind for its bearers. It safeguards against appropriation from ‘outsiders’ who do not understand the more subliminal, meaning-conferring aspects – because they are not trained to (or they simply do not value them). Such insularity is essential for its survival as a ‘living entity’ (i.e. as a ‘stream of consciousness’) which transcends individual partakers. This is especially so in advanced technological societies. This is arguably one of the reasons why it is difficult to gain entry into certain disciplines in Japan, Germany and France. In the United Kingdom attitudes are more open but, as this thesis has shown, many feel that standards of practice have declined – both quantitatively and qualitatively.\(^\text{25}\)

With intangible heritage, authenticity tends to be guided by the continuity of the historical document; it is an incremental perspective based on an implicit recognition of the necessity of constant renewal, embedded in practice. Thus the process of restoration (in terms of what is added to the historical document) is considered to be an important aspect of the ‘authentic’. In other words, authenticity does not solely reside in existing material fabric but can equally be confirmed by the nature of the restorative intervention – which is fundamentally different to restoration understood

\(^{24}\) In many ways, this is what the conservation profession is doing; by creating an ideological framework which (according to ECCO) is seeking legal enforcement which would effectively criminalise non-professionals (‘outsiders’). Intangible heritage does not presently enjoy the benefit of such legal enforcement – so it becomes secretive as a safeguarding mechanism. See for example: Janet Blake, *Developing a New Standard-setting Instrument for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage*, UNESCO, 2001.

\(^{25}\) This was confirmed in conversations with Yannick Chastang (from France) and Dr Edgar Mantz (from Germany) and with various Japanese students on UK conservation courses (because they could not train – and therefore gain entry – in Japan).
in the context of scientific conservation. Consequently, there is less emphasis on returning to historical accuracy (i.e. originality) and on control (by suspending the original object in time) and greater acceptance of transformation.

Intangible heritage reflects what has been described as a ‘diachronic’ conception of ‘heritage’ which seeks also to incorporate the continuity of history as sustained by people in traditions of practice. What is key here is that restoration is expressive and artistic (over and above mechanistic and scientistic); it resists subornation by formalised ethics (and the narrowing into particular ‘value-domains’) which are frequently felt to be oppressive in their administration (especially when they are applied by ‘outsiders’ who are felt to know little of their practice). The function of intangible heritage in restoration is to put the history of practice into the lacunae in order to sustain the symbolic meaning of the historical document because it is the physical object’s being in history that is to be understood as constituting its significance. So understood, the restorer is an author of history; the ‘artist of his time’. For him/her there are no ‘time-wall’ and no impasse of historicism to overcome and no sense of metaphysical ‘neutrality’. Intangible heritage is, therefore, the antithesis of the purely ‘synchronic’ conception of heritage.

At the centre of the tangible v. intangible dichotomy is a bifurcation in history, engrained in Western consciousness, which, this thesis argues, is a product of Western (scientific) epistemology.

**4.1.4: The Western epistemological tradition**

In broad historical terms, Western scientific epistemology is based upon the systematic observation and subsequent explanation of things or occurrences. Typically, phenomena are interpreted and the ‘data’ objectified in textual form (i.e. books). This process of ‘media-conversion’ can be seen to be linked historically to the European Church Reforms of the C17th. (through, for instance, the instigating works of Erasmus). The dissemination of the New Testament (i.e. a text) henceforth became the primary means of disseminating knowledge per se.

In the natural sciences data may be encoded in numbers which are combined with a form of abstract symbolism (as with, for example, physics or chemistry). A major
part of training in science is learning this language. Positive knowledge is validated by scientific method – in accordance to pre-given ‘qualifying’ criteria – such as, standards. Scientific method is systematic; its methods are technological; and scientific methodologically is objective. In practice, the process of objectification can be described as representing a ‘separation’ of knowledge of what from knowledge of how (a phenomenon which reveals itself through time). But in thinking it attempts to be impartial to relative ‘life-worldly’ (in Husserlian terms) concerns, such as religious feelings or any other form of relative ‘metaphysical’ cultural preferences; it is ‘beyond’ metaphysical intrusion.

For Husserl, the ‘life-world’ is the world in which we are immersed in the ‘natural attitude’ (of everydayness) that never becomes an object but which constitutes the pre-given basis of all experience – and which is historically-grounded. The ‘life-world’ exists in a movement of constant relativity and validity and is, therefore, the antithesis of all scientific objectivism. The scientific nature of modern science consists precisely in making tradition objective and methodologically eliminates any influence of the interpreter on understanding; hence the ‘non-participating’ observer. Consequently, its objectifying tendencies involve the dissolution of the connection with life. This owes much to its foundation in mathematics (i.e. logic); for instance, two plus two is always four, ten plus ten always twenty – regardless of one’s religious or cultural distinctiveness or personal preferences.

According to Kant, the explanatory power of science is the consequence of its basis in a logical, epistemic subject whose activities can be generalised and understood as ‘context-free’ operations. This logic ensures consistency, measurability and repeatability. It is universally applicable – an essential requirement of standardisation (in terms of thinking) and the reason why it denies metaphysical complexity in preference for (apparently) objective ‘neutrality’. However, the domination of the scientific epistemological model in Western culture leads to the discrediting of all the possibilities of knowing that lie outside of its methodological horizons – leading

(inevitably) to metaphysical (i.e. ontological) liquidation. It is for this reason (the thesis argues) why ‘heritage’ in Western civilisations is (erroneously) perceived as a completed development. And why methodological objectivity is recognised to be a major factor in the demise of the world’s cultural diversity.²⁹

In conservation (in terms of practice), scientific / technical studies improve understanding of underlying causes of deterioration and thus form an important part of preserving tangible heritage. The information gained (which can be disseminated in textual form) is instrumental to interventive practice. Training in the scientific aspects of conservation usually involves mastering the use of advanced technologies, such as using a Scanning Electron Microscope to see a surface topology. Using instrumental analysis to understand material problems (and potentially reveal other data) ensures more informed judgements (and arguably more technical problems). However, complex restoration frequently requires additional kinds of knowledge and judgement which scientific / technical knowledge does not provide on its own. The predominance of one over the other has been described in this thesis as sustaining a process of ‘epistemological fission’ (i.e. the separation of knowledge of what from knowledge of how).

In the practice of conservation, ‘epistemological fission’ is reflected in the gradual (i.e. historical) transformation of the literature – from books that describe techniques (which are practice-centred) to what are essentially recipe books (which are material-centred).³⁰ This is part of the process of naturalisation (i.e. sciencing) which is reflected in the discipline’s development throughout much of the last century – but it is especially noticeable in recent times. In furniture and decorative arts (for example), this transformation has occurred since the early 1990’s – coinciding with the various processes of professionalisation. The new literature (which is public knowledge) becomes the basis for educating the next generation of practitioners thus leading to a (so-called) knowledge-based discipline.

However, in education, practice (in the form of restoration) has been subordinated by


³⁰ Examples of literature have been provided in Section 1.3.4: ‘Education and training’.
(scientific) academic studies, recording and writing reports. This has decreased the
time spent on mastering creative techniques (i.e. the additional kinds of knowledge).
Higher education – provided by museums and universities – is the primary training
route (which is a requirement of the profession at European-level) but such
institutions do not provide training in specialist craft techniques to any credible
standard. They, therefore, (in turn) do not provide training in restoration (in the
adding to sense) to any credible standard. This is reflected in the rapid decline in
standards – voiced by many in the field (and documented by this thesis) – which has
occurred at the same time as professionalisation (i.e. since the early 1990’s).\textsuperscript{31}

This has led to degree of polarisation in the field. This ‘stereotyping’ (which has
occurred on both the art/craft and the academic/science sides) is linked to
connotations of ‘professionality’ and the cognitive supremacy of science and
research-based education and continuing development which, in the United
Kingdom, is synonymous with status, reward and social class. However, the
profession does make explicit that a conservator is not an artist or crafts-person, so
one could reasonably argue that the professionalisation of conservation (and all that
this entails) has been a causal factor in the decline of such capability by explicit
denial of its value.\textsuperscript{32} This is the unfortunate outcome of what was essentially
archaeological conservation (which had no theory of its own) adopting a fine arts
approach as the basis of professionalisation – which, in turn, has (arguably) become
an anti-craft movement; the very thing that John Ruskin (and his followers) deplored
about the (so-called) ‘Mechanical Age’. In this sense, the association of Ruskin with
scientific conservation in contemporary literature (it can be argued) represents a
debasement of his legacy.

Crucially, understanding material heritage does not lie solely in the \textit{nature} of the
materials of fabrication because the making process is always ‘culturally-specific’
(otherwise it would not \textit{be} cultural heritage). This means that the materials used in its
making cannot be considered ‘context-free’ (i.e. in purely objective terms) in their

\textsuperscript{31} Discussed in Section 1.3.4: ‘Education and training’.
\textsuperscript{32} Refer to Section 1.4.3: ‘Modern historical consciousness’ where Philippot characterised the
traditional crafts as fraudulent; originally cited from: P. Philippot, ‘Historic Preservation:
Proceedings of the North American International Regional Conference, Williamsburg, Virginia,
selection and, by extension, neither can the materials and techniques of conservation and restoration. In other words, in scientific conservation the *symbolic meaning* of the object which is (*ipso facto*) ‘culturally-specific’ lies outside of the formal methodology of interpretation. As a consequence of this, interventive actions frequently bear no relation whatsoever to the original maker’s work and, therefore, what he/she is likely to have wanted, expected or even been able to comprehend. This is why, on this conceptual level, traditions of practice are important because they maintain a thread of implicit understanding; the ‘stream of consciousness’.

When the new form of data (i.e. the books that form the basis of education) subordinates capability in practice, the long-term effect inevitably leads to the de-sublimation of the tradition of practice and the negation of its historicity of understanding (and related aesthetic sensibilities, aspirations, spirit and so on) in favour of the technical / rational interpretation, which eventually takes its place. Crucially, this may not be felt by the newly trained generation of practitioners (until they enter practice) leading to a ‘why shouldn’t I do it that way?’ attitude. This is a common response from conservation students. The overall effect is a loss of intangible heritage which (from the bearer’s perspective) is replaced by what might be described as a kind of learned ignorance; an apparent education without training.33

This difficulty is routed in the predominating ‘materialist’ view of history. Unlike intangible heritage (when the ‘partaker’ is a descendent of the ‘living’ tradition of practice – in the historicist historiography sense), the positivist historiography (in this sense) prefers ‘dead’ history in that it does not connect to the present through living practice. The pieced together data becomes ‘effective history’ when it is superimposed upon culture itself. This anomaly (i.e. between the world understood as lived experience and the world studied as data) causes epistemic tension in interpreting heritage. It has been argued in this thesis that this tension is felt most strongly at the point in time when history becomes ‘nearer’ to the present; when the horizons of the positivist historiography ‘fuse’ with the horizons of the present reality. The positivist historiography must focus on the past in order to exist at all.

33 Many experienced practitioners I communicated with explained that they felt that newly ‘trained’ graduates often possessed some knowledge about what should be done but lacked the capability to do it – even at a very basic level.
There is, therefore, an abridgement to be overcome between the past (as constructed within a positivist historiography) and the present. The fact that all activities in the present are the culmination of the past does not enter into its horizon of knowing because this historical method recognises only the past as historical (essentially in materials) while ‘forgetting’ the historicity of the present (in people). It is for this reason that it requires an (undefined) lapse in time before it takes effect. In conservation, for example, not knowing whether to remove an earlier repair (even though aesthetically acceptable but historically ‘wrong’) is partly a reflection of this tension; leading to the ‘conundrum’ discussed in Section 2.2.2. Also linked to this is the general anonymity of the restorer, who is, in a very real sense, the author of the historical document, but whose work only later becomes valued once it enters the horizon of the positivist historiography. By contrast, intangible heritage because it is embodied in people, and thus ‘living’ in the present reality, requires no time-lapse for the work to have intrinsic historical worth; it is instantaneously historical. And there is (therefore) no abridgement (or impasse) to overcome.

It is largely as a result of this that the historicity of practice is not valued commensurate with its importance to the heritage sector. The authors of history are thus alienated from the material of history which ‘their’ tradition of practice (which they have inherited) created in the first instance (and subsequently fashioned through their work). In other words, the subjects of history are separated from the objects of history. This object / subject dualism is replicated today in the competing claims of the tangible v. intangible heritages internationally. Consequently, it is not considered (for example) that much of the architectural heritage throughout Europe in reality represents the work of contemporary ‘authors’. Much the same may be said of our national collections.

The positivist historiography can be understood then, as a form of methodological

35 For illustrative examples see: The Future of the Past: Attitudes to Conservation 1174-1974, edited by Jane Fawcett, Thames and Hudson, London, 1976. Alternatively, visit the buildings and look for yourself and while you are there talk to the ‘authors of history’ (as I do).
abstraction – which forms the foundation of the modern historical consciousness and contributes to a sense of disconnectedness with the past. The predominance of this historical method in Western culture, therefore, not only distorts reality but at the same time annihilates history itself (i.e. history in the making, in the form of practice, or process). Our understanding of the past (and the present) is accordingly made partial; hence the ‘closure’ of thought. This is a major factor in the broad downgrading of maintenance / repair / restoration practice and the knowledge / expertise associated therewith (which is apparent in conservation literature). It has contributed to the ‘us and them’ attitudes that have polarised much of the heritage sector throughout the United Kingdom – which is central to the ideological division documented by this thesis and why (it argues) the central philosophical question of preserving heritage is epistemological. This situation is the inevitable outcome of the Western epistemological tradition – the foundation of which is science – which has also been a major influence on fine arts restoration theory.

4.1.5: The misappropriation of Brandian theory

The figure of Cesare Brandi has come to dominate much contemporary discussion. Brandi’s *Theory of Restoration*\(^\text{36}\) was essentially formulated for the restoration of paintings and sculpture (i.e. the fine arts). It is also well-suited for archaeological restoration (in terms of both moveable and immovable heritage), although Brandi does place greater emphasis on aesthetics than might normally be called for in the restoration of archaeological objects; but the underlying principles are nonetheless similar.\(^\text{37}\) Training institutions (throughout the United Kingdom) such as, universities and museums, use the fine arts model as a template for their courses for furniture and decorative arts conservation-restoration – in accordance with European-wide professional guidelines on education and training provided by ECCO. This is combined with scientific / technical studies (deriving historically from archaeology).

Brandi’s ideas were largely influenced by C19th. European ‘philosophies’ and are thus ‘modernist’ and ‘Euro-centric’ (i.e. ethno-centric) in nature. According to his

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\(^\text{37}\) It has been mentioned (in Section 2.2.3: ‘Authentic restoration – from materials and form to process’) that Brandi, together with Paul Philippot (ICCROM) and Harold Plenderleith (ICROM) formed a significant triumvirate in shaping the direction the field of tangible heritage preservation took during the second half of the C20th.
theory, the object for restoration is understood as pure phenomena; as a physical entity which transmits a visual image. Brandi’s theory thus starts from a phenomenological position. It does not start from an epistemological, ontological, or spiritual position as would be required, for example, by a theory based on practice which, by extension, might effectively incorporate intangible heritage (and authenticity as an aspect of intangible heritage). His theory of restoration is, therefore, superficial in the sense that it emphasises visual appearance (or visual oneness in Brandian terms) and the retention of historical material fabric. As such, its primary value-domains are the ‘aesthetic’ and the ‘historical’, respectively – which are believed to be inherent qualities of objects (rather than attributes of knowing subjects). His theory is, therefore, also reductionist.

In practice, in general terms, objects are considered unique. This is particularly so in the case of paintings which embody the unique genius of the painter’s technique; his/her individual brush-strokes are considered sacrosanct, for example, and thus can never be repeated or replicated without aesthetic and historical misrepresentation (i.e. forgery). In addition to this, the painter is frequently known. Much the same can be said of the uniqueness of sculpture. It may also apply (to some extent) in architecture – although the need for ‘conservation-led’ renewal of architectural fabric (largely due to the devastating effects of pollution in certain regions) is typically quite different to paintings – as restoration frequently is with other ‘functional’ objects such as, furniture, objects of the (so-called) handicrafts and much decorative art.

When an object is considered archaeological in kind there is considerable time distance (i.e. distanciation) between the time of initial creation and the present. A primary concern of archaeology is to develop ‘scientific’ knowledge associated with the civilisation to which the object ‘belonged’ (but not necessarily to which it ‘belongs’ in the historically-transcendent sense). Distanciation can have the effect of lessening the obvious connectedness with the present. In many ways, archaeology helps to overcome this tendency but it can also contribute to it if the heritage is not understood in the appropriate way. For instance, archaeology is a science (and thus epistemological in the scientific sense) and therefore, as a discipline, not very good at recognising ontological connections that civilisations may have with certain kinds of heritage; such as, religious monuments which cannot be fully understood when
interpreted with a scientific epistemological model (some reasons have been given above). In this sense, archaeology, when it ‘sees’ only the past as historical, can diminish the object’s living vitality by not taking into account the ontological ‘status’ of the artefact in terms of the present reality. A current example of this (arguably) is the issues in the Middle-East between archaeologists (many of whom have trained in Western institutions) and religious leaders and other ‘cultural’ representatives.

According to Brandian theory then, in ‘restoration’ appearance takes precedent over material substance (as in homogeny of) and (where applicable) the functional qualities of objects (i.e. their ‘use-value’) are downplayed. For this reason, when lacunae are in-filled or losses replaced (i.e. restoration in the adding to sense), the primary objective is to re-create visual unity. It thus advocates ‘non-like’ restoration – which leads to the idea of ‘neutrality’ (i.e. neutral restoration undertaken in such a way to avoid causing a so-called aesthetic or historical forgery). In architecture (typically archaeological) this may be referred to as anastylosis – a term which also has its origins in European practice (such as, the Greek architect Nikolas Balanos); it is also an abstract, reductionist and ‘non-like’ form of restoration. Conversely, Brandi states that the reverse is true in the handicrafts when the material (as in homogeny of) must take precedence over the image (i.e. appearance) whenever restoration is deemed necessary.

However, Brandi does not expand on this nor does he establish a definition of ‘handicrafts’ and which objects might be included under the term. This is because his theory is essentially concerned with fine arts (particularly paintings). Nonetheless, the importance placed on material substance over appearance (in ‘handicrafts’) implies that process is important (because the process of restoration is determined by the use to which materials and technology are put). This suggests that an epistemological (i.e. in the knowledge of how sense), ontological, and/or spiritual starting point (as would be found in the intangible heritage) may be more appropriate for the handicrafts. The functioning of Brandian theory (through, for example, professionalisation – and all that this entails) in areas typically associated with handicraft practice would appear then, to offer some explanation as to why there are tensions in the field today relating to process. It is essential, therefore, to understand just what constitutes ‘hand-craft’.
Well, objects of hand-craft traditions might be understood as the physical manifestation of accumulated knowledge / expertise which has been passed-on through continuity of practice (because it is valued as such). It could be argued that this progression is unique to any given culture and even regions or groups within a culture and gives rise to diverse styles, materials and techniques which are characteristic of that particular culture, region or group. Indeed, the same could be said for both the portable and importable heritage. But unlike in paintings and sculpture, the creator is nearly always anonymous and the object seldom the outcome of a single creative instance (as tends to be assumed in Brandian theory). There is, therefore, rarely an attempt made to identify him/her, although the culture, region or group is often well-studied (in the positivistic historiographical sense). In addition to this, the designer, or perhaps the firm that the maker worked for, may also be known, but seldom the maker him/herself which, in furniture and decorative arts (for example) may involve many specialist artists/craftspeople.

Objects tend, therefore, to be understood generically as the products of creative traditions of practice; for instance, ‘the cabinet-making tradition’ which might incorporate a range of specialists in: surface decoration, finishing techniques, wood-turning and carving, upholstering, veneering, gilding and so on. For the practitioner, the tradition exists prior to his entry and continues after departure from it. It can, therefore, be understood as a living system of knowing that is sustained through continued practice. It does not remain static. As a ‘living entity’ it transcends the individuals who are merely ‘partakers’. The partakers are thus bearers and transmitters of an historical continuum; the (so-called) ‘stream of consciousness’ – upon which the continuity of that tradition resides as a meaningful and ‘value-laden’. In other words, through time (i.e. historically) it acquires intrinsic value which is the basis of intangible heritage.

The intrinsic value of intangible heritage – because it transcends individuals – can only be apprehended on a ‘higher’ dimension of knowing; hence it is subliminal and thus ontological in character (and not epistemological in the scientific sense). In an attempt to explain this, if one considers a team sport, such as a football or rugby match, one can sense the temper of the game at different stages – competitive,
intense, relaxed, fast or slow moving and so on – this higher sense transcends the
individual players and thus cannot be apprehended by focusing on a single player’s
performance or by any quantitative analysis. Yet, it determines the quality of the
game and, therefore, the way we tend to remember it and attribute value to it.
Traditions of practice (this thesis argues) work in much the same way – as living
cultural entities. As the intrinsic value becomes associated with a particular mode of
practice it attracts new partakers which sustain the living entity – both in terms of its
character and its connectedness to the past. Working with particular materials and
techniques or using particular tools, or setting up one’s workshop in a particular way
or area, is all part of the intrinsic value which sustains the tradition of practice. It
needs noting, however, that many (so-called) ‘partakers’ will be aware of this only
on a sub-conscious level. Therefore, the introduction of another knowledge system
– in the case of conservation: ‘science’ (which brings technological innovation) –
would be rather akin to playing hockey in the middle of a football match; although
their may be certain ‘universal’ benefits (such as, keeping fit and healthy, team spirit
etc.) it simply does not work because its underlying structure is entirely different.
This rationalization is necessary in order to understand the essence of intangible
heritage.

The progression of styles is the tangible outcome of this historical process; museum
collections, for example, are its temporal realisation – a physical record of intangible
heritage. Cultivating and sustaining this depends upon those who are ‘enculturated’
by appropriate education and training, understanding and experience. Knowledge-
transfer is thus essential for its survival. For this reason (the thesis argues), an
epistemological, ontological (or spiritual) starting point for a theory of restoration
based on practice is necessary. The misappropriation of Brandin theory, which is
based on an understanding of tangible heritage as pure phenomena and which
therefore) reduces authenticity to an apparent visual integrity alone, in disciplinary
and material contexts for which it was not formulated is a methodological fallacy.
This fallacy is arguably sustained by the international heritage community;

38 The similarity between the size, contents, arrangements and situations of the furniture / decorative
arts workshops I visited during this research was undeniable. Indeed this was part of my visual
observations. Also, the frequently expressed view that a single practitioner should (ideally) be
responsible for each project he/she works on ‘from start to finish’ (in terms of its
repair/restoration) is a legacy of the Ruskinian / Morrisian philosophy.
professionalisation is an aspect of this.

4.1.6: Authenticity

The development of the concept of authenticity has become central to the (so-called) ‘post-modern’ understanding of heritage. In the discipline of scientific conservation (and in accordance with Brandian theory), authenticity is primarily identified in historical material fabric. With the use of advanced technologies (typically found in public institutions), this can sometimes be taken to extremes. For instance, instrumental analysis (such as the use of a microscope) facilitates the ‘positive’ identification of original substance from later accretions / additions / alterations which may subsequently be removed because they are not valued as such in that working context – despite being considered by some to be a vital part of the historical document. This phenomenon (a common enough occurrence) can lead to so-called ‘conservation controversies’. This kind of ‘instrumental’ interpretation (and problem) tends, therefore, to be ‘resource-specific’ and, by extension, ‘context-specific’.

This thesis argues that it is largely because of this that contemporary practice can lead to a tendency towards technological-determinism (i.e. when advancements in technology, through its application in practice, become discernable on the historical document itself) and thus have massive bearing on its future ‘reading’ and historical authenticity. In fact, continuing professional development (discussed in Chapter 1.3) is largely based on research into new material applications, indicating that the field itself is largely driven by technology. It is, however, important to recognise that technological determinism is not necessarily a phenomenon which can be identified on a single object but can be understood in terms of the way in which the discipline is organised and administered and how it ‘sees’ progress and development. For example, in scientific conservation, technological innovations are understood as part

39 See for example, James Beck’s (et al.), Art Restoration: The Culture the Business and the Scandal, Cambridge University Press, 1993 which discusses the restoration of fine arts heritage – the issues are not unrelated to such technological developments (and especially the use of solvents). In relation to this, ArtWatch International was founded by Beck, Professor of art history at Columbia University, to monitor and campaign for better practices in the conservation of art works. The United Kingdom branch, ArtWatch UK, is run by Michael Daley. Information about ArtWatch International is available from: http://www.artwatchinternational.org/ and ArtWatch UK: http://www.artwatch.org.uk/
of the field’s progress – which today has a market-orientation. Such forces are not attributable to single institutions but are part of a wider international movement. It is, therefore, substantive in character. This can cause material ‘trends’ which typically fluctuate according to availability and context (and, this thesis argues, the stock of knowledge in the field at a given time). The use of advanced technologies in practice is a foreseeable outcome of positivism in interpretation because science (more accurately scientific thinking) and advanced technologies are synonymous (as evidenced on conservation courses).

In conservation practice in public institutions there is broad denunciation of conjectural restoration (in the adding to sense). This tends to be interpreted in terms of design (i.e. form) rather than process (i.e. the materials and techniques used in practice). However, it can be argued that the use of any material that puts an object’s appearance at odds with its structure and substance is also conjectural – on grounds of incomplete understanding of ethical practice and a lack of awareness or consideration of the importance of process. Ruskin, for example, found such practice wholly undesirable (see Section 3.1.1). Typically, the age of the object determines its historical worth (i.e. its ‘age-value’) although other specific factors may also be taken into account, such as ‘style’. If later restorations have been undertaken then they might be retained on grounds of their historical worth. A balance, therefore, tends to be struck between appearance and age-value; in other words, the object’s aesthetic and historical qualities (which is consistent with Brandian theory). However, the emphasis on retarding deterioration inevitably results in the actual realisation of ‘newness-value’ (but only in terms of its appearance). Importantly, the uses of modern synthetics have no obvious aesthetically-favourable aging characteristics. It was for this reason (i.e. acquired ‘age-value’) that Ruskin (for example) strongly opposed the use of modern building materials and techniques, putting him in opposition to Viollet-le-Duc who supported their use.

Therefore, in terms of process, restoration (carried out in the name of scientific

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40 In recent years in the domain of furniture and decorative arts (for example) epoxy resin has become popular, as has Paraloid B72 (used as a surface finish). There are a good number of other so-called ‘conservation grade’ materials that have recently found favour in training institutions. It is important to note here that the author has found none whatsoever that requires greater expertise to apply than traditional methods. There use is evidently linked to capability – although this may be masked by ethics.
conservation) typically does not attempt to ensure *acquired historical worth*, i.e. authenticity cannot be *added to* the historical document; it can only be revealed in so far as it exists. This way of understanding authenticity informs the fundamental precepts of ‘minimum-intervention’ and ‘reversibility’ (which is today more precisely known as ‘re-treatability’); while ‘discernability’ is a (perhaps inevitable) by-product. The function of reversibility, therefore, *denies* the continuity of the historical document and, in terms of restoration (in the *adding to* sense), is arguably an admission of that which is in-authentic. It can further be argued that reversibility (perhaps paradoxically) legitimises repeated restoration – which necessarily works against ‘minimum-intervention’ over the long term.

Authenticity thus has the effect of subverting the concept of ‘living authorship’ particularly when interpreted in an extremely positivistic way (which is not uncommon in the United Kingdom). The inevitable subversion of ‘living authorship’ that this implies is partly due to the lack of an epistemological (as in *knowledge of how*), ontological, or spiritual understanding of restoration practice – the inevitable outcome of Brandian theory. The replacement of *lacunae*, in this sense, is intentionally *a-historical* (i.e. neutralised). As such, restoration practice is *value-less* and rendered *intentionally meaningless* – and, therefore, lacking authenticity; necessarily so. In this way, there can (arguably) be no real possibility of enhancing the symbolic meaning of an historical document – except in so far as the interventive treatments may be of interest exclusively to conservation scholars; for instance, as a tangible record of ‘scientific’ expression. But this does not represent ‘heritage’ in the intangible heritage sense of the meaning because it is devoid *of* such meaning (because it pertains to be ‘neutral’ and thus beyond metaphysical ‘intrusion’). As a general rule, therefore, in the discipline of scientific conservation, with respect to the practice of restoration and from the standpoint of process; the greater the historical value of an object the greater the loss of its historical authenticity.

This is one of the main reasons why in universities (for example) on conservation courses in furniture and decorative arts (which is taught at Bachelor-level up) there is

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41 The ‘meaninglessness of intentionality’ is the antithesis of intangible heritage, cultural diversity and much that the (so-called) ‘post-modern’ Heritage Preservation Movement has come to stand for (discussed in Part II).
a great deal of ‘non-like’ restoration carried out which is encouraged by the teachers. This might be anything from fills, to surface coatings and decoration, to the replacement of entire elements. In fact, as a general rule: on conservation courses quite literally any material / technique might be used in restoration. Such students frequently do not possess the knowledge / expertise to follow a ‘like-with-like’ approach.\(^\text{42}\) However, at Higher National Diploma (HND)-level (which is usually not considered conservation in the scientific sense) there is more emphasis on practical craft skills. There is, therefore, more emphasis on ‘like-with-like’ restoration and far less emphasis on ‘non-like’ restoration. Where both kinds of courses are run at the same institution the contrast in approaches is palpable.\(^\text{43}\) The variability in outcomes that this causes correlates with the introduction of conservation teaching in this domain in recent times in line with the professionalisation of the field. Such ‘non-like’ restoration is not only synonymous with the science component of the courses; it is also evidently synonymous with a fundamental lack of skill nominally associated with traditional craft practice. It is for this reason that conservation ethics are (arguably) untenable. And further, that the contemporary concept of authenticity (i.e. authentic process) is not achievable.

The movement in the concept of authenticity (i.e. from materials and form to process) reflects a ‘world view’ of heritage in all of its diverse tangible and intangible manifestations which has come about largely because of the global context within which heritage preservation is today understood. The realisation in the West that not all cultures interpret authenticity solely in the materials of fabrication is (theoretically) diametrically opposed to the essentially ‘authorised’ positivistic methodology. Other cultures appear to be better able to ‘see’ beyond the material dimension by exalting other values and understandings of ‘heritage’ and other reasons for its preservation – as evidenced in formal documentation.\(^\text{44}\) The West would typically describe such cultures as either ‘traditional’, ‘underdeveloped’ or ‘third world’ (and sometimes as all three).

\(^\text{42}\) One student I spoke with returned to the same institute to undertake an HND following successful completing of a BSc(Hons) in conservation the previous year.
\(^\text{43}\) This was discussed in Chapter 1.3: ‘Professionali sation in the United Kingdom’; see in particular Section 1.3.4: ‘Education and training’.
\(^\text{44}\) It needs stressing here that these are the formally ‘authorised’ views; many artists/craftspeople I communicated with have no problem ‘seeing’ beyond the material dimension.
This ‘trans-culturalisation’ of the Heritage Preservation Movement has thus revealed other ‘life-worlds’ (in Husserlian terms), manifested in complex systems of knowing and experience, which have transcended time and continue in the form of meaning-conferring practice into the present. In many ways, this is a reminder of our own pre-industrial and pre-scientific and pre-mechanical past (which, although declined in the form of practice, has evidently not entirely disappeared); their validity surely lies in their rarity. The continuation of traditional art/craft practices in the United Kingdom throughout the C20th. owes a great deal to John Ruskin and William Morris and their supporters. Their continued influence is (no doubt) among the primary reasons why the (so-called) ‘paradigm shift’ from craft to science in the field of conservation (brought about by professionalisation) has been such a problematical transition. These difficulties (it can be argued) are largely the result of the homogenising effects of international standardisation and the subsequent loss of cultural specificity and diversity – embodied in the traditional arts and crafts – which Ruskin and Morris sought to safeguard. That is why they are associated with intangible heritage and why (in turn) they are central to the contemporary concept of authenticity.

This broadening of the heritage horizon first makes known and then undermines ‘modern’ Euro-centrism (or ethno-centrism). The concept of ‘heritage’ in the post-modern period is characteristically relativistic, plural and democratic in nature which contrasts with the modern ‘Enlightenment’ tendency towards foundationalism in philosophy and absolutism in knowledge (in the scientific sense). Recent times have brought growing respect for cultural diversity and recognition that there are sub-groups within cultures that are important to our understanding of the past. New terms such as, ‘inclusivity’, ‘sustainability’, ‘values’ and ‘renewal’ create a new understanding of heritage preservation as one that is based on ‘the cautious management of change’ – it is, therefore, less ‘rigid’ and cannot be scientifically ‘reduced’ (or simplified) and it is more complex than merely retarding decay. Not only is transformation recognised to be inevitable; but agreeable.

45 This is an Oakeshottian interpretation, explained in Roy Tseng’s The Sceptical Idealist, Imprint Academic, 2003. See in particular Chapter II, Section II.2.5: ‘Foundationalism in Philosophy’ (p.26).

46 The idea of ‘managing change’ is accredited to Jonathan Ashley-Smith who is presently writing a chapter of a book about these wider ‘cultural’ issues.
Authenticity understood as a form of process is a celebration of the ‘living’ – as the embodiment of the past – thus overcoming the conception of ‘heritage’ as one based purely on materials and ‘disengaged’ memory (and perhaps overcoming the impasses of modern historical consciousness and the subsequent ‘time-wall’ of preservation). Authenticity is no longer solely based on the ‘aesthetic’ and the ‘historical’ – it is cultural, meaningful and historically-transcendent.

4.1.7: Authenticity understood in relation to intangible heritage

It has been noted above that the discipline of conservation throughout the Western scientific / technical and political-institutional sectors does not recognise the concept of adding to authenticity. Interventions (especially noticeable in loss-compensation) are subsequently not undertaken with the intention of enhancing meaning in terms of restoration process but may be intended to enhance understanding (of the physical object) by re-creating visual oneness. This is the derivation of European restoration theory which has been most comprehensively articulated by Cesare Brandi (following a number of earlier European theorists). Ethics attempts to ensure that such interventions are not permitted to become part of the historical document in any historically-transcendent meaningful way (except perhaps for scholars of conservation who might wish to retain them). The primary purpose of restoration is merely to re-create visual parity in order to improve the object’s visual legibility – nothing more.

This diminution of authenticity to an apparent visual integrity alone has been identified as being attributable to Brandi’s phenomenological starting point. This ‘superficial’ interpretation of the ‘external and given material’ is largely because the conceptualisation of the materials found in works of art is lacking. In Western aesthetics this can be traced back (through Brandi) to Georg Hegel’s ‘epiphany of the image’ – a view which has been attributed to his attraction to mysticism in his youth (see Section 1.4.2). It is this lack in the conceptualisation of the materials which allows for the use of ‘non-like’ materials in restoration (in the adding to sense). But it is, nonetheless, still restoration. However, the material used has a great bearing on the stock of knowledge in the field – especially with respect to the role and status of the historic arts and crafts (which represent centuries of heritage in European culture). Indeed, it could be argued that Hegel’s continuing influence has contributed
to anti-craft sentiment within the international heritage community which clearly has religious/spiritual underpinnings.

The suitability of such ‘non-like’ restoration is invariably considered from the point of view of not harming the ‘valued’ material – hence a ‘synchronic’ conception of restoration. Making judgements about compatibility is usually achieved (in the first instance) by identifying a problem and then, by experimentation and testing, ‘scientifically’ validating the solution. The application of such a treatment is thus technologically-determined from start to finish. The scientific basis of practice leads to an ‘infinity of tasks’ (a Husserlian concept) which gives purpose to the problem-solution activity of science; which, in turn, gives rise to a self-perpetuating dynamic – which subsequently becomes the basis of professional development. This ‘problem-solution’ dynamic is typically understood as progress. The association with advanced technologies (including materials) gives the impression of advancement, while the cognitive supremacy of science (synonymous with ‘invention’, ‘discovery’ and ‘breakthrough’) confers authority, leadership (and perhaps: ‘Vanguard’). Science has the peculiar tendency to present itself as the solution to the problems it has created, but none of this means that restoration (in the adding to sense) is carried out with corresponding supremacy. Indeed, quite the opposite may be the case – as this thesis has attempted to bring to light. And, of course, it fails to take into account associated ‘intangibles’.

Attempts to restore only visual parity tends to have the effect of ‘reducing’ the interventive process to a pragmatic (or empirical) level; thereby arguably rendering the newly restored item quite unrepresentative – and thus a falsification – of the creative tradition whence it derived. The examples referenced periodically throughout this text may appear pedantic but the contention presented applies to numerous objects and many heritage domains. Therefore, it is surely vital that the conservation profession understands that the materials and techniques used in any work of art or fine craft will not have been ‘context-free’ in their selection and application, respectively – as tends to be assumed. Much the same, therefore, can be said of any making tradition that intentionally uses natural materials. And the sole reason why makers such as, Alan Peters, Martin Grierson and Humphrey Sladden – who are arguably ‘authentic’ heirs to the Ruskin-Morris-Webb-Lethaby legacy in
furniture and decorative arts – all insist upon a ‘like-with-like’ approach to restoration (which is also consistent with SPAB’s ‘unique philosophy’).

The attempts that the field of conservation makes in order to retard decay (the principal problem) has been particularly necessary in public institutions which have the responsibility of caring for artefacts. This has been hugely beneficial to their preservation; but this is not the same as restoring them. In their ‘new’ environments, the artefacts have been removed from their cultural contexts (i.e. their ‘life-worldly’ contexts) by a process of phenomenological reduction\(^{47}\) (museum collections often having been put together from all regions of the world). In the process, they have different values ascribed to them (typically ‘aesthetic’ and ‘historical’). As such, they are de-contextualised which, in a broad sense, can have the effect of denying their cultural specificity – especially in the sense of their ontological connectedness – causing them to become partially ‘muted’ in terms of their symbolic meaning and ‘performative power’ (and perhaps even, depleted as works of art). This has surely occurred in some measure and has (it would seem) become an issue facing Western museums in the contemporary ‘post-modern’ era; embodied in the concept of ‘Inclusive Museology’. In other words, the museum itself has become disengaged and culturally abstract (on the ontological level) which is surely the inevitable conclusion of methodological reductionism (and physical re-location) relating to the ‘scientific’ objectification of the past in material form only.

In a sense, by creating an archive of material remains, and thus laying the foundation of a positive historiography, haven’t the objects been systematically ‘separated’ from their subjects? And, isn’t this why the tangible heritage has inevitably lost its sense of connectedness to culture itself – particularly on a higher subliminal level? Is this not then, also the sum achievement of an essentially scientific epistemological interpretive model which engenders the discrediting of all the possibilities of knowing that lie outside of its paradigmatic horizons, thus leading to the overwhelming of the performative qualities of ‘heritage’, ‘accessible’ through, what might be called, an ontological paradigm? If this is the case then this is another reason why there is a need to (re-)synthesise ontology with epistemology and the

\(^{47}\) This methodological approach was examined in Section 1.4.2: ‘Phenomenological reduction’.
ruption brought about by ‘scientific’ epistemological reductionism (and subsequent ‘closure’) – argued in this thesis. Surely this is all the more vital as the (essentially occidental) Heritage Preservation Movement expands into a global context?

Many museums tend to acquire their collections in an already ‘restored’ state. More often than not the objects ‘do not require extensive work’ – hence there is an emphasis on care.48 This is because such objects have already been restored by artists and craftspeople; the (so-called) ‘authors’ of the historical document. Outside of the museum context, work is often highly complex and frequently demands a great deal of artistic / creative expertise. This helps to sustain certain forms of knowledge which has been inherited (and is valued accordingly).49 Yet, this essential knowledge is grossly under-developed within conservation practice in the United Kingdom.50 This is partly because museums (which have been influential in the development of the conservation profession and all that this entails) do not recognise the need for it, partly because they do not appear to value it and partly because they do not appear to understand it. And the professionalisation of conservation (based on an essentially archaeo-museological model) aims to standardise practice throughout Europe – something which bearers of intangible heritage would surely wish to resist and which is inconsistent with wider concerns relating to cultural diversity.

Crucially, intangible heritage is ‘organic’; it lives. As such, recording the practitioners’ (i.e. the bearers’) actions (or even collating oral histories) would provide no more than a tangible recording of intangible heritage not intangible heritage as it is in itself. And, as noted earlier, museums (for example) already possess a tangible record of intangible heritage. The living heritage would be

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48 J. Kitchin, Interview with the author, 12th June 2005.
49 One of the interviewees is a fifth-generation cabinet-maker – inheriting a practice which extends (in the same family) for over 250 years. He values its continuity. He considers himself essentially a craftsman-restorer and teaches ‘qualified’ conservators who lack necessary expertise while at the same time (ironically) feeling marginalised by the ‘scientific’ conservation profession.
50 See Chapter 1.3: ‘Professionalisation in the United Kingdom’. This appears to be the case throughout the heritage sector in the UK – as expressed in various reports in Section 3.1.2: ‘Recent developments with respect to intangible heritage’. However, this situation is also consistent with many of the views expressed to me by specialists in various heritage domains internationally through online discussion. Mark Gottsegen, Associate Professor, University of North Carolina, Greensboro provided his (unpublished) paper: The Decline of Visual Arts Education, and a Remedy, 2005 which explains how craftsmanship has been downplayed in higher education and emphasises the importance of knowledge of materials and techniques in conserving and restoring art (in this case paintings).
different every time it was recorded because it is a lived experience which does not stop at the time of objectification (and subsequent media-conversion). In fact, attempts to record intangible heritage might even constrain its vitality and subsequent on-going transformation. It can live only in a free state. It, therefore, cannot readily be controlled in a scientific way. In other words, full (not partial) knowledge of intangible heritage comes only through performance; it is thus objectified only through the practitioners’ actions in the form of practice. Value is attributed to the historicality of the performance – which is an expression of the past but which always resides in the present reality. Therefore, in order to safeguard it, the factors that cause it to diminish must be removed, or at least reduced (as with all preservation), and the factors that sustain must be recognised and enhanced so that it may flourish.

It must resist the objectifying tendencies of science because (this thesis has argued) it is largely because of this why, in Western heritage administrations, the tangible heritage became ‘separated’ from intangible heritage – both consciously through methodological reduction (i.e. reduction to aesthetic and historical values), representing the closure of all possible value-domains; and spatially through methodological abstraction (i.e. physical separation from its ‘life-worldly’ context; for example, by museum-acquisition). However, objects (portable and moveable) cannot be ‘authentically’ sustained for an indefinite period without intangible heritage (despite the attempt to ‘freeze’ them in time). Treatment interventions are always an expression of their time (which reveals itself in time). Consider for instance, architecture (because it is easily observable); a great deal of the most significant buildings throughout Europe, due to the need for constant renewal of their material fabric – both inside and outside – represents (in terms of form and substance, techniques, feeling, expression etc.) the restoration works of C20th. ‘authors’. They are artists of their time. Yet, this is under-acknowledged in heritage preservation discourse; the perspective is simply not developed.

For example, a superficial observation (as indeed most people will make) of the North entrance of Westminster Abbey in London confirms that it is a contemporary building. A substantial amount of material was, in fact, put in place within the past twenty years. However, what tends to remain most powerful to one’s mind is the
idea of Westminster Abbey (typically understood in terms of style, period, social, cultural and political context and so on) but frequently with such buildings very little (if any) of the original idea remains a physical reality. Surely (one can argue) what keeps it unmistakeably and thus ‘authentically’ Westminster Abbey, or St Paul’s, or Hampton Court Palace (or Cologne, or Trondheim, or St Ouen – and so on) is its connectedness to culture itself; restoration, by the constant renewal of material fabric, sustains this connection and prevents it from becoming symbolically depleted.\footnotemark{51}

In this sense, if their fabric was restored in a radically ‘non-like’ way; for instance, with a modern material, such as prefabricated concrete, then, due to the rapid deterioration of their existing fabric and the subsequent need for its constant renewal, surely they would in a very short period of time lose their authenticity? It is for this reason that it can be convincingly argued that such restoration sustains (historical) authenticity and also sustains intangible heritage. The idea that authenticity cannot be added to the historical document is extremely restrictive and (in any case) tends not to reflect much of what is actually done in practice – as the examples above illustrate. Moreover, if authenticity exists only in the original (i.e. it can only be revealed in so far as it exists), then what part of a monument (for example) that may have taken one, two, three, five or six-centuries (or even longer) to build is authentic? In other words, what is the fixed point upon which authenticity (so conceived) is determined? Surely such buildings are never completed without being restored?

It has been argued in this thesis that this is partly the effect of positivism in historiography which does not ‘see’ (and therefore value) the historicity of the present, although the present restoration work will become valued ‘historically’ in time (but only after a ‘time-lapse’); and typically, therefore, when the original ‘author’ of the restoration is dead (hence conservation’s affinity with dead history). There is always a requirement of a lapse in time before what is done in the present

\footnotetext{51}{See for example, The Future of the Past: Attitudes to Conservation 1174-1974, edited by Jane Fawcett, Thames and Hudson, London, 1976 in which images of Westminster Abbey taken in 1654 and 1880 (p.89) show the extent of transformation – which is quite different again today due to the work which has been carried out since WWII but particularly in the past two decades. Other examples can be found in Stephen Tschudi-Madsen’s, Restoration and Anti-Restoration: A Study in English Restoration Philosophy, Universitetsforlaget, 1976.}
enters its horizon of knowing. Hence it sees only the past as historical while ‘forgetting’ the historicity of the present – leading to the (so-called) ‘time-wall’ of heritage preservation. To restate, it is essentially history that has been re-created and inscribed by non-participating observers (who attempt to restore meaning in the form of historical knowledge they themselves have not inherited through practice).

This lack of participation confirms its abstract (methodologically ‘objective’ or ‘neutral’) stand-point. It is a product of the objectifying tendencies of scientific thought (and the subsequent liquidation of metaphysics) which lies beneath the Western epistemological tradition. It has the effect of overpowering perspectives that have developed around the continuity of practice (which are essentially incremental and not necessarily backward-looking).\(^\text{52}\) It is interesting to consider then, in what ways (other than in terms of information or its physical structure) might a (so-called) non-participating observer ‘know’ a piece of finely-crafted work, more completely than a practising master craftsman who has inherited an age-old tradition – over two, three, four, five or even ten centuries – in the full richness of its authenticity? This abstract approach to interpreting ‘heritage’ has (arguably) contributed to the feeling that the past is a completed development and thus ‘separated’ from the present (which, of course, is a factual impossibility).\(^\text{53}\)

Authentic process is determined by the use of particular materials and techniques and by particular people in particular contexts. This departure, which represents a comparatively recent bifurcation in history, tends therefore, to be revealed in the way in which technologies (including materials) are used in restoration practice. This has caused disagreement between the essentially Eastern and Western approaches to heritage preservation. In some areas of Japan (for example) intangible heritage rejects the Western conception of conservation-restoration by resisting modern scientific / technological means. In other words, Japan seeks to sustain the (so-called) historical ‘streams of consciousness’ by supporting traditional practices and, 

\(^{52}\) This became clear to the author when Beckford described how he adds to his collection of wood-carving chisels – a step-by-step incremental process of advancement. One who uses a modern tool (that is not the correct shape) is necessarily taking a backward step.

\(^{53}\) One of the outcomes of this is the contemporary phenomenon of (so-called) ‘live interpretations’ and/or ‘re-enactments’ which might be described as a kind of post-modern pathological idiosyncrasy – suggesting a loss of inherited understanding. Surely such phenomenon would be logically incomprehensible to other civilisations – especially pre-industrial and pre-scientific cultures that maintain a strong sense of continuity?
therefore, authentic restoration process. They appear to know that the Western scientific approach to ‘heritage’ severs this continuity and annihilates intangible heritage in the process – just as it is (arguably) in danger of doing in the United Kingdom.

Notwithstanding, the traditional arts and crafts throughout the West are in many ways similar to Japan in their thinking (for that is surely what makes them what they are). But the prevailing professional conservation ideology, which is dominated by the scientific / technical and political-institutional sectors throughout the West, does not see it this way. This is one of the main reasons (this thesis argues) why there have been so many issues in the United Kingdom with respect to process (such as, standards of capability, materials / techniques used, exclusion / marginalisation from the field and so on). Consequently, the traditional arts and crafts, as a bona-fide aspect of intangible heritage are eradicated, and such ‘academic bullying’ (based largely upon the cognitive supremacy of science) is de facto a form of cultural (or sub-cultural) negation.

One of the underlying problems of globalisation, as underpinned by Western political economies (which are information-led and founded on an essentially scientific epistemology), is the threat it poses to the world’s cultural (and natural) diversity. It was mentioned earlier in this conclusion that the objectifying tendencies of science are recognised as a major contributory factor in the demise of the world’s cultural diversity. The emergence of scientific thinking has also (in this conclusion) been linked historically to the European Church Reforms and the subsequent success of political economies in Europe; the (so-called) ‘dismal science’. Thus, globalisation may be understood as an extension of the (so-called) ‘Protestant era’ but which is (arguably) devoid of its spiritual content which has become extinguished (or maybe hidden) by its materialist and consumerist virtues. The homogenisation of cultural divergence – which is essentially a process of standardisation and thus conformity – is not unrelated to the present reaction, manifested in the upsurge in religious consciousness in various regions of the world. It seems then, that what happened in the United Kingdom in the eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries with respect to the

54 Discussed in Chapter 1.3: ‘Professionalisation in the United Kingdom’. 

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(so-called) ‘Mechanical Age’ has in many ways become a global issue.

This is one of the reasons why UNESCO, among others, has recognised the need to safeguard the world’s intangible heritage. It is also one of the reasons why environmentalism has become a global concern – which was given impetus by John Ruskin in the C19th, coinciding with the rise of the ‘Mechanical Age’. The proliferation of advanced technologies, which globalisation brings to new regions of the world, poses a serious threat to the continuity of intangible heritage. In fact, by extension, this has a great bearing on the world’s ‘stock of knowledge’ which has shifted massively in recent times from knowledge to information (led essentially by occidental trans-national corporations). In broad terms, this is one of the main reasons why, throughout the last two centuries, the peoples of other civilisations have tended to become ‘Westernised’ rather than Westerners becoming ‘Easternised’ (for example).55 The net effect is a gradual homogenisation of humankind – according to Western ‘universal’ ideals – and a simultaneous loss of the world’s cultural (and biological) diversity, culminating in the need for an ecology of human life (intangible heritage).

UNESCO (which is essentially a Western scientific organisation), although it recognises the need to safeguard intangible heritage, formally maintains the separation between the tangible and intangible domains. This is a reflection of the bifurcation in history (expressed by this thesis) which is symptomatic of the subject / object dualism in Western thought. This organisation (as with the Western political-institutional sectors in general) still largely circulates the idea of ‘universal value’. This is also reductionist in the sense that it can have the effect of homogenising difference instead of nurturing plurality. How, for example, can the deeply symbolic aspects of different cultures (and inherited customs and practices), which may have been cultivated for thousands of years, be valued universally without being levelled out (i.e. reduced) in the process? The advocacy of universal values does not reflect reality; it is an ideology; a scientistic ideology. How can, for example, a creation that is steeped in the evolution of one civilisation be ‘valued’ in the same way by someone from outside of that civilisation? It is palpably impossible – as it is

55 Useful sources here are The Cultures of Globalization, edited by Fredric Jameson (et al), Duke University Press, 1998; and the writings of Noam Chomsky and Immanuel Wallerstein.
impossible to convey the full depth of meaning of speaking in another person’s tongue by merely reproducing the same sounds. Universal recognition or appeal or responsibility perhaps; but universal value, no.\textsuperscript{56}

In the United Kingdom (and throughout much of Europe and the West), although recognition of intangible heritage is gaining acceptance, the (authorised) conception of ‘heritage’ as a completed development still tends to prevail. This is an extension of the modern historical consciousness that emerged in Europe at the end of the C18th. – as a product of the Enlightenment philosophies. It has been largely ‘manufactured’ (and sustained) by the scientific / technical and political-institutional sectors of the State (such as, museums, universities and other heritage organisations) through an educational system which is established upon an essentially scientific epistemology; but it is not established on the historicity of practice (and related ways of life) and the values that may be attributed to this and necessary in order to sustain it.

This conclusion began by arguing that intangible heritage remains of only secondary importance within the context of the Heritage Preservation Movement of Western culture. The (so-called) ‘authorised’ approach to ‘heritage’ was described as perpetuating a general shift from ontology (of practice) towards technology (a consequence of scientific methodology). With respect to the practice of restoration, this (so-called) ‘sciencing’ necessarily contributes to the de-sublimation of the field, manifested in the loss of aesthetic sensibilities and certain kinds of ‘tacit knowledge’ (which is under-valued and/or becomes de-valued). This was described (in philosophical terms) as a process of naturalisation, whereby unique, value-laden, and historically-transcendent perspectives of ‘heritage’ become subsumed into the authorised, the given and the consensual – and in effect ‘reduced’ to the ‘aesthetic’ and the ‘historical’ in the process.

The subsequent ‘closure’ of thought is arguably the sum achievement of the so-called ‘paradigm shift’ from craft to science augmented by professionalisation (ICOM, ECCO, ICON etc.) and which (in terms of practice) has its origins in archaeology.

\textsuperscript{56} UNESCO’s \textit{Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity}, 2001 in some respects concedes this.
Consequently, put in simple terms, the United Kingdom, Europe and the West are not very good at sustaining intangible heritage – as evidenced in comparing the UNESCO ‘World Tangible Heritage List’ with its equivalent ‘World Intangible Heritage List’. Crucially, the prevailing conception of heritage does not reflect the aspirations of many practitioners within the wider heritage community who wish to sustain their practices in living form but who have been marginalised by mainstream conservation discourse in recent years.

This thesis (therefore) has established the need to synthesise the tangible v. intangible heritages by acknowledging authenticity of process. Achieving this will re-create the subject / object relationship that has become ‘separated’ historically in the West by the processes of methodological abstraction and reduction and subsequent objectification (the basis of scientific thought). In practice, how materials and technology are used in restoration (in terms of what is added to the historical document) and our ability to interpret and understand this will determine the nature (and therefore the authenticity) of the historical document of the future. It will also determine the fate of intangible heritage the world-over. It is because of this that this thesis calls for an ‘opening up’ of our understanding of the past (and the present) in order to counter these reductionist tendencies. Authenticity must surely be understood in relation to intangible heritage – especially given that intangible heritage is understood to be the overarching paradigm through which all heritages are perceived. It was made clear at the beginning of this conclusion that this necessitates the fostering of a broader (and therefore inclusive) understanding of ‘heritage’ which would enable the transmutation from the exclusivity of a modern to the plurality of a post-modern view. It is largely because of this that the central philosophical problem of preserving ‘heritage’ is epistemological. This forms the basis of the reflections / recommendations outlined below.

4.1.8: Reflections / recommendations

A contemporary theory of restoration
This thesis recognises the need to cultivate a more broadly conceived view of ‘heritage’. In order to achieve this, Cesare Brandi’s (and much of the West’s) theory of restoration would need to be rethought from a broader epistemological starting
point and not a phenomenological one. ‘Epistemological’ in this sense does not solely refer to scientific knowledge (i.e. in the knowledge of what sense) nor does it preclude it; it also reflects knowledge which is sustained in the form of practice (i.e. knowledge of how) and the value that may be attributed to that practice; the so-called ‘tacit dimension’. As such, the complex ‘life-worldly’ modalities of experience related to this, which presently support alternative reasons for preserving the past which often lie beyond aesthetic and historical values alone, may also be incorporated; or indeed vice-versa, given that the intangible heritage is now considered to be the overarching paradigm through which all heritages are understood. Knowledge of practice, for example, in its social context, cultural specificity, and its spiritual, religious, ritualistic and/or aesthetic inflections (and so on) are all aspects of intangible heritage. This is surely no less relevant to the West, than it is to the East, the North and/or the South?

Formulating a theory of restoration around an epistemological position would open up a ‘pathway’ into an essentially ontological dimension, which is otherwise precluded by the limitations of the prevailing phenomenological position. The synthesis between epistemology and ontology would at the same time synthesise the tangible and intangible heritages. This might be described as the next phase of the Fichetian / Hegelian triadic ‘thesis, antithesis, synthesis’; the synthesis of the tangible v. intangible ‘elevates’ the heritage sector to a ‘higher’ dimension which fits well with the post-modern vision of heritage. So understood, the aim of restoration – when it is deemed necessary and in terms of what is added to the historical document – would be the restitution of the ‘authentic’ intention and the re-establishment of historical concordance (thereby overcoming the impasses of historicism and the subsequent ‘time-wall’ of heritage preservation). Only by recognising this in relation to the process of restoration can we move closer to passing on to future generations, their inheritance – tangible and intangible – ‘in the full richness of its authenticity’ while at the same time sustaining cultural diversity and ensuring a more representative, inclusive, and thus democratic approach to the past, the present, and the future.

On a more practical level, this recognition of the necessity to rethink a theory of restoration from an epistemological starting point (i.e. to ‘incorporate’ intangible
heritage and authenticity as an aspect of this) necessitates the formulation of a doctrine based around the conceptualisation of the materials and processes found in tangible heritage. But this must also take into account how such materials sustain intangible heritage; for instance, urushi lacquer sustains the age-old practice of urushi lacquering; wood, wood-carving and so on – no scientifically formulated substitute does this. This might represent the first stage towards synthesis between the tangible / intangible domains. It is vital, though, to recognise that the ideas expressed here are not about the wholesale restoration of the tangible heritage – far from it. They are about seeing restoration as a necessary means to sustainable preservation and bringing thinking about the practice of restoration into line with contemporary developments. To that end, interdisciplinary research and leadership is essential.

Interdisciplinary research and leadership
The époque-making Yamoto Declaration on Integrated Approaches for Safeguarding the Tangible and Intangible Cultural Heritage (2004)\(^{57}\) might be used as a starting point in developing this ‘new’ vision of heritage. Perhaps a meeting of experts should similarly be convened to discuss the possibilities for Europe and the West. In this connection, national and international authorities, governmental and nongovernmental organisations and specialist scholars and practitioners actively engaged in heritage preservation should welcome and explore strategies to integrate – in a consistent and mutually beneficial way – the safeguarding of tangible and intangible heritage. In this connection, the conservation profession would surely benefit by being more willing to embrace the multiplicity of diverse and unique forms of cultural expression which together constitute the tangible and intangible heritages of humanity – the world-over. And public institutions (such as museums and galleries) should perhaps be more transparent with respect to their ‘in-house’ conservation-restoration activities by (for instance) making readily accessible (to the public) records / documentation pertaining to this.

In terms of leadership in the United Kingdom, the Department for Culture, Media

and Sport (DCMS) might perhaps consider setting up a section (similar to that in France – discussed in Section 3.1.3) responsible for policies (e.g. legal), strategic development (e.g. the creation of national inventories to ensure appropriate stakeholder inclusion) and liaison at UNESCO-level. It might also consider proposals for potential funding for research, development and knowledge-transfer. With respect to this latter point, it is recommended that appropriate means of specialist training provision are identified and established – both formal and informal. This must be done in such a way to attract (potential) bearers of intangible heritage in a variety of disciplines. This might necessitate (for instance) a carefully considered selection process in order to ensure that: i. the bearer has the necessary knowledge; ii. that he/she should desire to promote their knowledge to inspire learning; iii. that he/she is willing and capable of passing this on; and iv. that an equally careful selection process is established for potential trainees.

In addition to establishing a central authority for recognising, promoting and ensuring the direct transmission of intangible heritage, the living context should not be precluded. This would necessitate a broadly conceived approach, which might involve (for instance) liaison with specialists located in various regions and/or groups. Once identified (by selection based, for example, on a national inventory), mechanisms would need to be developed to ensure that it does not conflict with their interests; it would be quite inappropriate to expect specialists to pass on their knowledge if this was not in their personal interests to do so. For example, there may be significant cost factors to consider because it is (typically) time-consuming to pass on the kinds of knowledge that has (often) been inherited from several generations of practice. There may also be issues relating to the availability of tools and equipment or the limitations of the market etc. Appropriate levels of funding would therefore need to be awarded to bearers of intangible heritage in order to alleviate such difficulties and to create a harmonious situation for trainer and trainee. Such funding would be allocated by the DCMS (via the respective funding bodies) in recognition of its overall responsibility to the intangible heritage domain.

All this said. One cannot overstate the magnitude and complexity of the recommendations suggested here. Essentially, it involves a change in thinking about heritage by the recognition of a much broader perspective. Therefore, in addition to
the above, this must involve the various key institutions and authorities working together with the relevant stakeholders in order to generate the will – so that formal mechanisms can be implemented – and build capacities on a national (or indeed international) scale. This might involve, for instance, input from institutions of Higher Education – in particular museums and universities, which (this thesis has argued) have a central role to play; not least because of their responsibility to care for vast collections of tangible heritage, but also because this can be used to create awareness of the intangible through their numerous communication networks internationally. And teaching about intangible heritage would surely help to foster greater interest amongst subsequent generations. Such institutions might also establish greater links with the architectural sector on aspects of intangible heritage which could add to this momentum.

Some of these ‘key’ institutions might also work in collaboration with the United Kingdom National Commission for UNESCO which is in regular liaison with UNESCO Headquarters, Paris (and thus in touch with current developments on the international scene). The UK Commission advises the DCMS on such broader developments (with the aim of establishing formal policies which provide direction and encourage outreach) but which also might create incentive for Government in general to recognise the vital role of intangible heritage – to our cultural and creative diversity, to our ‘fuller’ sense of inheritance and perhaps also as beneficial to the economy at large. This latter point might encourage support for small businesses (SME’s) which are (potentially) a dynamic source of intangible heritage. Indeed, there is a vast amount that can be achieved if a comparable effort was committed to the safeguarding of the intangible heritage as is presently being considered (for instance) with respect to ‘heritage science’.58 But it is important to acknowledge that it is likely to be some time before this ‘new’ perspective of intangible heritage (understood as the overarching paradigm) is fully realised in the United Kingdom. And to that extent, this thesis should be understood as a small step in that direction.

With these suggestions in mind, Ralph Millard’s principle of ‘like-with-like’

restoration / reconstruction in medical surgery (cited at the beginning of this conclusion) invites comment. Firstly, Millard upholds that if ‘like-with-like’ substitution cannot be accomplished, then one should use the next, ‘most similar tissue substitute’; the goal being ‘to camouflage the reconstruction as much as possible’. This is done in order to create an effect ‘as subtle as a chameleon changing colours’. Therefore, if the surgeon’s work can ‘pass unnoticed’, he/she is to be ‘congratulated as having accomplished his/her task as a reconstructive surgeon’.

Millard also makes clear that one should ‘avoid settling for the simplest procedure just for the sake of simplicity’ but acknowledges that more complex problems ‘may require more complex solutions’, and that ‘the simplest approach may be inadequate’. He also recommends that ‘a sound plan must provide restoration of function and aesthetic form’ which he explains are ‘the fundamental goals of plastic and reconstructive surgery’. 59

Now, although the conservation profession has sometimes been inspired by the idea of medical surgery (as evidenced in contemporary literature), clearly this approach cannot be applied to all heritages; for instance, it would be ridiculous to think that we should simply restore all heritage on this principle. No, it has been included here mainly to emphasise the fact that preserving the past concerns far more than retarding the decay of old materials and to make clear that the practice of restoration (in particular) is not ‘a necessary evil’ and that the historic arts and crafts do not constitute ‘faked expression’ but are in fact intimately connected to activities which in so many ways embody the past – a past manifested in the idea of the intangible. However, we are in real danger of losing all the wealth of knowledge tied up in a generation who have come to be the guardians of generations of practice and terminating a continuity (and all that this implies) that would otherwise sustain this legacy for the benefit of future generations. Whether specialists such as, Beckford, Sladden or Luckhurst, or the stonemasons at Lincoln, York, Wells or St Paul’s call themselves ‘conservers’ or ‘restorers’ does not matter. But the idea of intangible heritage, and the way this has in recent times impacted upon the cultural function of restoration, surely does matter. It is with this in mind that it is necessary to stress

here one last time, that it is ultimately *our* responsibility to safeguard this legacy.
Account of sources

The account of sources is divided by seven sub-headings, as follows: ‘References’ – which includes all material referred to in the main text in a single alphabetical listing;60 ‘Personal communications’ – which includes electronic communications (such as emails) and interviews / discussions. The transcribed interviews / discussions are held in the Buckinghamshire Chilterns University College furniture archives;61 ‘Other personal communications’ includes other discussions (not transcribed); ‘Exhibitions’ – includes visits to various institutions; ‘Site visits’ – includes visits to various workshops / places of significance etc; ‘Conferences / seminars attended’ – provides details of those events attended; ‘Other useful websites’ – provides the web addresses for the various institutions / organisations; and finally, ‘Suggested further reading’ – provides other references (not referenced in the main text) that may be useful for further research.

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60 The single alphabetical listing (rather than divided by sub-headings for various kinds of literature) is based on P. Dunleavy, *Authoring a PhD: How to Plan, Draft, Write and Finish a Doctoral Thesis or Dissertation*, Palgrave MacMillan, 2003 who recommends the following: ‘A single unified bibliography arranged in a strict and predicable alphabetical ordering is best for all textual materials’ (p.130).

61 These are filed at the Furniture Research Centre, Faculty of Creativity and Culture (formerly Faculty of Design), Buckinghamshire Chilterns University College, High Wycombe and may be made available by contacting Prof. Jake Kaner.
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Manchester College of Arts and Technology (MANCAT), Arts and Creative Crafts End of Year Show (including conservation-restoration), 19th June 2005.
Royal College of Art, Victoria and Albert Museum, Degree Show, 27th June 2006.
Sir John Cass Department of Art, Media and Design, London Metropolitan University, Summer Show, 26th June 2005 and 17th June 2006
Textile Conservation Centre, Winchester School of Art, University of Southampton, Winchester, Open Day Visit, 24th June 2005.
Tower of London Show, 17th July 2006.
York College, Furniture Exhibition, The Guildhall, St Helen’s Square, York, 20th June 2005.

Site visits

All Saint’s Church, York
Ashmolean Museum of Art and Archaeology, Oxford
Balliol College, Oxford
Bodleian Library, Oxford
British Museum
Church of St. Michael le Belfrey, York
Darwin Centre, Queen’s Gate, London
Edward Barnsley Workshops, Petersfield
Guildhall, London
Houses of Parliament, Westminster
Lincoln Castle
Lincoln Cathedral
Little Surrenden Workshops, Kent
Manchester College, Oxford
Natural History Museum
Radcliffe Camera, Bodleian, Oxford
Royal Albert Hall
Sion House, Middlesex
St. Benedict’s Church, York
St. John’s Church, York
St. John’s College, Oxford
St. Leonard’s, York
St. Margaret’s Church, Westminster
St. Martin le Grand, York
St. Martin’s Church, York
St. Mary the Virgin’s Spire, Oxford
St. Mary’s Abbey, York
St. Mary’s, London
St. Paul’s Cathedral
Trinity College, Oxford
Victoria and Albert Museum
Wells Cathedral
Westminster Abbey
Windsor Castle
York Minster Cathedral

Conferences / seminars attended


Other useful websites

ArtWatch International – information available from: http://www.artwatchinternational.org/
ArtWatch UK – information available from: http://www.artwatch.org.uk/
Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP) – information available from: http://www.crvp.org/
Crafts Council, United Kingdom – information available from: http://www.craftscouncil.org.uk/about/index.html
European Confederation of Conservator-Restorers’ Organisations (ECCO) – documents available from: http://www.ecco-eu.info/
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